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Book Reviews
Law And Psychology In Conflict. By James Marshall. The BobbsMerrill Company, Inc., Indianapolis: 1966. Pp. 119, including index.
John Dewey, a worshiper in the temple of science, said "the
future of our civilization depends on the widening spread and
deepening hold of the scientific habit of mind." But perhaps there
is more truth in an old wisecrack of Oliver Wendell Holmes:
"Science is a good piece of furniture for a man to have in an upper
chamber provided he has common sense on the ground floor."'
After a couple of hectic years in charge of a first grade classroom,
a teacher once told me that everything she had learned in school about
teaching methods was either obvious, irrelevant, or wrong. It would
be unfair to dismiss this book in these terms, but the temptation exists.
There are three chapters and a brief conclusion. Chapter I is largely
obvious, Chapter II is mostly irrelevant, and the conclusion is probably
wrong. I have nothing much against Chapter III.
The argument in Chapter I is unlikely to startle any lawyer. It is
that testimonial evidence is often inaccurate, quite apart from the
sincerity of the witness, because of faults in his perception, memory,
or powers of expression.' Such dangers provide many of the standard
reasons given for the right to cross-examine a witness. Law students
are pretty sophisticated about perception errors; almost every year I
am asked by some member of my Evidence class whether I am going
to repeat the famous psychology experiment in which the class is surprised by a staged fight in -the classroom, and then asked to report
accurately what happened. (There are always great disparities in
the accounts.)
But, while in a general way lawyers know about these dangers,
Chapter I is valuable in giving a detailed account of the kinds of errors
which can exist, with supporting references for further investigation.
The author, a distinguished member of the New York bar, also relates
the errors in a practical way to specific problems in administering the
rules of evidence. For example, he points out the danger of permitting
the memory of a witness to be refreshed by an inaccurate newspaper
account of the event in question, and supports this with a report of a
psychological experiment.
He illustrates the tendency of a witness to interpret what he sees
in accordance with his preconceptions and expectations by psychological
1. STANDEN, SCIENCE Is A SACRED Cow 35 (1950).
2. This topic is commonplace as an introduction to the study of the problems
of testimonial evidence. See, e.g., the two page text note in MAGUIR4, W4INSTEIN,
CHADBURN & MANSFIELD, CASES AND MATERIALS oN EvIDENcE 200-02 (5th ed. 1965),
giving many references for further investigation, mostly in books or periodicals written

for lawyers.
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experiments with the famous Ames room. To the viewer, the room
appears to be an ordinary room, in the shape of a rectangular solid,
with the wall at which the observer is placed removed. There are
shapes on the other three walls which appear to represent ordinary
rectangular doors and windows. Various strange things appear to
happen in the room. If persons of equal height are placed at each of
the rear corners of the room, the one on the right will appear to the
observer to -be a giant -

his head almost touching the ceiling -

while

the one on -the left will seem very small. If they exchange positions,
the midget becomes the giant, and the giant the midget. The explanation is that the window and door outlines and other features of the
room are in fact of irregular shape, with, for example, the right edge
of -the -rear wall being much closer to the observer than the left edge,
and the floor and ceiling of the room sloping towards each other at
that edge. But ,from the carefully chosen perspective of the observer,
the room appears normal. The right edge of the rear wall, which is
shorter and closer to the observer than the left edge, deceives the eye
and 'brain, which are used to seeing and judging rectangular rooms,
into concluding that the figures placed in it are distorted rather than
the room -itself. Even an observer who knows the trick shape of the
room "sees" the room as ordinary and the figures as distorted; only by
conscious effort can he interpret the figures as being the same size.
(It has been reported that when a wife sees her husband in the Ames
room, she sees him correctly and the room as distorted. Apparently
spousal conditioning overcomes architectural conditioning.8 )
In Chapter III, the author reviews the psychological factors which
may be in operation in the individual trier of fact's interpretation of
the evidence, and in the interaction in the jury room. The common
tendency to think in a way which will not do violence to preconceptions,
to stereotype people and 'situations, and to come to agreement with
others, may well produce distorted results.
If there are a number of apt illustrations of the pitfalls involved in
presentation of evidence at trials in Chapters I and III, Chapter II
is much less satisfactory. Called "Some Vagaries of Recall," it is a
lengthy report of an experiment, in which a brief film strip was shown
to audiences of police trainees, law students, and people attending a
settlement house. The film showed a scene which might have been interpreted -as an attempted kidnapping of a baby from its carriage by a
young man. Immediately after seeing the film, or a week later, or at
both times, under varying conditions,4 'the viewers were tested for
memory of the events seen and heard at the showing. The author and
his psychologist collaborators draw such conclusions as that the better
educated subjects and the more "punitive" subjects tended to recall
more items correctly and to draw more inferences than the others, that
3. See

GREGORY,

EYE AND BRAIN: THE PSYCHOLOGY Ol SEING 180 (1966).

4. For example, some members of the audience were told that the young man
had been charged with attempted kidnapping, and of this group, some were told that
he had previously been convicted of molesting children. Others were told that they
were to be witnesses for the defense.

ch. 11 (1966).
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all witnesses recalled a relatively small proportion of the possible items
in the film (but were apt to do better when a direct question was asked
as to the existence of an item not spontaneously recalled), that all groups
"recalled" some things which had not in fact happened, that the persons
being tested tended to do better when urged by a "status-figure" (law
professor or police captain) to try hard, and that correct recall tended to
diminish with the passage of time.
Few of these conclusions are surprising; as is true in many excellent scientific experiments, the mouse which emerges from this ponderous experimental mountain is not even particularly interesting. But,
while the general conclusions seem, as a matter of common sense, likely
to be true, the method of reaching them exhibits weaknesses typical of
those likely to arise in any attempt to apply the experimental method to
the problems of social science, including those of the legal process.
Humpty Dumpty insisted that, when he used a word, it meant
exactly what he chose it to mean, neither more nor less, even if his
choice did not accord entirely with usage. This point of view is a dangerous one -for the writers of questionnaires. At one point some of
Marshall's experimental subjects were asked whether the young man
in the film had sideburns, a question dealing with what the author
describes at page 57 as a "perfectly clear and straightforward characteristic" of the person. In fact, frames from the motion picture, reproduced in the book, show that the subject's hair beneath the temples
descended to a point near the lower end of the tragus.5 This is somewhat lower than more conservative modern styles, but reasonable men
might differ as to the presence of "sideburns," and at least one standard
definition of that word is inapplicable to hair style shown in the film.6
My analysis is confirmed by a highly unscientific sampling of some of
my colleagues on the law faculty. About half thought the hair style I
have described was "sideburns." The other half was divided between
those who thought that the term was ambiguous and might be used for
anything from the style shown in the book to the lower hairline of the
traditional sideburn, and those who assumed that sideburn still meant
what is used to mean -in the good old days of General Burnside.
This example is trivial, as far as its effect on the conclusions
drawn by Marshall is concerned, but it illustrates a real problem. You
cannot put the "sideburns" question to a typical population sample in
terms of the relative positions of the hairline and tragus. If you ask
the sample to draw pictures of the hairline, you have problems of interpreting and classifying the answer as "right" or "wrong." You might
do better with multiple choice pictures on the test, at least in this case,
but the shadings or meanings in the imprecise terms we use in everyday language produce problems in social investigation which are
hardly significant for the traditional experimenters in physics or chemistry, with their more precise symbols.
5. The tragus is that bit of cartilage which protrudes from the face, just above
and forward of the ear lobe, and partially covers the entrance to ear canal.
6. TH AMxRICAN COLLXGz DICTIONARY (1958) defines sideburns as "short

whiskers extending from the hairline to below the ears and worn with an unbearded
chin."
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Another problem is that the preconceptions and expectations of
the experimenters are difficult to banish from the experiment, quite
apart from problems of simple definition. For example, it is asserted
that there were 115 items in the motion picture to be recalled, and it is
clear from the context that -the writer does not mean merely that questions were asked about 115 items, 'but rather that 115 possible items
to report existed.' This is clearly an arbitrary assumption of the experimenters. Is the picket fence shown in the film one item, or is each
picket a separate item?
The experimenters' assumptions are not limited to interpretations
of the facts, but extend to values. They purport to compare the "punitiveness" of the three classes of experimental subjects, according to
the subjects' selection of appropriate penalties for ten crimes, ranging
from "murder" to "gambling." For each crime, the choice presented
ranged from psychiatric treatment or fine, through terms of imprisonment, to life imprisonment and the death penalty. Psychiatric treatment was regarded by the experimenters as less punitive than a fine
or imprisonment, life imprisonment as less punitive than the death
penalty. While most of us would agree with these judgments, surely
there are those who 'would not, and some of the minority might have
been among the experimental subjects. 8
Furthermore, alternative explanations appear possible as to some
of the data which the experimenters regard as showing punitiveness.
We are told that for all crimes investigated, taken together, about
67% of the police subjects, 41% of the law students, and 32% of the
settlement house people ranked above the median for all groups on the
"punitive" scale.' It may well be that law students tend to be less
punitive than police trainees and more punitive than settlement house
people. But if you ask a police trainee -the appropriate punishment for
murder, he may think primarily of the felony-murders and premeditated murders which are apt to loom largest in his limited professional
experience. The law student may recall the broader class of common
law 'murders, including some acts traditionally punished less severely
than those just mentioned. The man from the settlement house may
have such a hazy idea of murder that he includes in his concept what
would actually be manslaughter or only tort. Such differing ideas
might tend to produce differing views of the appropriate penalty, consistent with the results reported.
Finally, one wonders how "honest" the subjects were. They knew
they were being tested. Might they not sometimes have given the
answers that they thought were expected of them, no matter what their
private views were? Does a police trainee consider a stiff penalty
because his training leads him to believe that a policeman should reflect
7. MARSHALL, op. cit. supra note 4, at 44, 54 (1966).
8. It should be said that to the extent that the experiment is only interested in
the consequence of the subjects' attitudes, the fact that some subjects may regard life
imprisonment as a fate worse than death is irrelevant; as long as we know their
punishment preferences, we can impose our own view of degrees of punitiveness upon
them without distorting the external effect of their attitudes, whatever may be said
for the validity of our scale of values.
9. MARSHALL, op. cit. supra note 7, at 74.
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a stern attitude towards crime? If so, he can vote that way, secure in
his support of ,the principles of his calling, but knowing that nobody is
actually going to be punished more severely on account of his response.
Perhaps these difficulties have little or no effect on the validity of
the particular conclusions of the author. But they are serious insofar
as they point to endemic problems for the experimenter in law and social
science. If the experimenters stick to what is precisely measurable and
definable in human response, their results can often be no better than
trivial; if they make simplifying assumptions about values, meanings,
and responses, these may be inappropriate or wrong, and their conclusions may therefore be misleading. In his concluding 'remarks, the
author attributes the -resistance of lawyers to a partnership with psychology largely to the conservative natural law roots of the legal profession. Perhaps the resistance is due as much to suspicion of the overinflated claims which sometimes emerge from the idolizers of scientific
and quasi-scientific method.
What can be expected from the experimental method of the natural
sciences when applied to a field like the law? The method is likely to
begin with a conjecture about how certain things are, or how they
behave. Some kind of observation is contrived to test the conjecture;
it usually consists of a series of experiments under controlled conditions.
Experimental results may prove the conjecture wrong. The hypothesis
that every hen's egg contains one and only one yolk is disposed of by
finding one double-yolked egg. On the other hand, the experiments
may tend to support the hypothesis, although a general, affirmative
proposition can never be proved unless all members of the class can be
tested. A hundred broken eggs, all with single yolks, can not be conclusive evidence of the truth of our conjecture. A very well tested
and still possible conjecture is a theory, which wi'th relatively little
risk may be called a scientific law.
How much of what is grist for the mills of justice is subject to
this kind of controlled experiment? A very large number of the problems of the law are problems of value and policy. No experiment can
tell us whether it is desirable to abolish billboards by law, or a good
idea to exclude hearsay evidence in court. The most that experiments
can tell us is what the facts we think relevant to our value judgments
are, or which conjectures about the way in which things or people
behave are very probably true. We might, at least in theory, learn that
billboards increase sales of advertised goods, or increase traffic accidents, or that hearsay evidence is less likely than eyewitness testimony
to report events accurately. But difficult policy questions remain.
And in practice, experiment can often not even tell us what the
relevant facts and principles of conduct are. How would we really
establish convincingly by experiment that billboards increase traffic
accidents? If we could show a high statistical correlation between
billboards and accidents, it might exist because advertisers tend to place
billboards on heavily traveled roads, and accidents rise in proportion
to traffic volume. Removing billboards from heavily traveled roads
might not reduce accidents at all. And if we were permitted to remove
billboards to test this conjecture, could we be sure that, if accidents

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. XXVII

did decline, this was due to billboard removal rather than, say, improved weather conditions? It is very difficult to be sure that we have
isolated the significant factor in social science experiments. It is easier
in physics and chemistry. Also, human beings are less manageable for
experimental purposes than chemicals.
Problems of definition, on which the validity of principles must
rest, tend to be greater outside the natural sciences. Sulphur dioxide
can be defined with relative ease and precision. But what is a billboard?
Does the concept include a large sign painted on a barn wall? Those old
Burma-Shave signs?
I do not mean to suggest that scientific method can tell the lawyer
nothing of value. The difficulties inherent in experimenting with people
can sometimes be reduced to a point at which scientific investigation
produces answers which carry a high degree of conviction. The author
suggests some fruitful inquiries, particularly in his third chapter.
Certainly, the trial lawyer wants to know as much about the psychology
of the juror as he can. Perhaps, particularly for certain kinds of disputes, the courtroom battle of the adversaries is less likely to guide the
jury to an accurate conclusion than some other form of procedure.
Perhaps, even, the proposition in the last sentence is capable of a moderately convincing demonstration by experiment.
To say that we cannot solve most of the professional problems of
lawyers by experimentation, is not to say anything adverse either about
experimentalism or law. Even the imperfect experiment can suggest
a clue or strengthen an hypothesis. Wisdom, clear thinking, reflection,
common sense, consultation, and dispute, when applied to the best
understanding of the facts possible, can solve problems, either used
alone, or with experimentation. In a way, it is too bad that the relatively straightforward method of science often does not work outside
the realm of science. But perhaps on balance we should be glad that
we have found problems which do not seem to yield to mechanical forms
of resolution - glad that we can find no common measuring rod for all
of the territories of man.
John M. Brumbaugh*

Recovery For Wrongful Death. By Stuart M. Speiser. The Lawyers
Co-Operative Publishing Company, Rochester, New York: 1966.
Pp. 1094, including appendices and index. $28.50.
Any discussion of wrongful death actions must begin with the rule
of Baker v. Bolton, i.e., that "in a civil Court, the death of a human
being could not be complained of as an injury."' As a consequence
of Lord Ellenborough's decision ".

.

. it was more profitable for the

defendant to kill the plaintiff than to scratch him, .... "' In view of
*

Professor of Law, University of Maryland School of Law.

1. 1 Camp. 493, 170 Eng. Rep. 1033 (1808).
2. PROSSXR, ToRTs § 121, at 924 (3d ed. 1964).
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this anomaly, the Fatal Accidents Act of 1846, or Lord Campbell's
Act,' was passed in England, so as to allow the decedent's personal
representative to maintain an action for the benefit of certain designated persons.
Notwithstanding earlier decisions to the contrary, the illogical
rule of Baker v. Bolton was adopted by American Courts." Legisla-

tures in the United States reacted by following the example of Parliament. Every American state now has some statutory remedy for
wrongful death. The statutes enacted vary in approach, in designation
of beneficiaries and in the measure of damages. The author notes that
legislatures were often concerned with the possibility of excessive
awards in view of the difficulty in measuring the damages suffered as
a result of wrongful deaths.5 Therefore, maximum restrictions were
imposed and, by 1893, twenty-two states had such limitations. Although
there has been a steady decrease in the number of jurisdictions imposing
restrictions, twelve state statutes still contained limitations in 1965.6
In addition to typical wrongful death statutes, many states including Maryland have enacted "survival" statutes.7 Whereas a wrongful
death act compensates either the survivors of the decedent or his estate
for losses sustained by either, a survival statute generally permits recovery 'by the decedent's personal representative for damages which
the decedent could have recovered had he continued to live. A number
of states have also passed special legislation creating a special right
or action where death is caused under specified circumstances.'
In this book, Mr. Speiser reviews the common law rule and the
development of legislation relating to wrongful death. An appendix
to his treatise contains the text of Lord Campbell's Act and the applicable statutory provisions of the United States, all fifty states, the
District of Columbia, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands.
In addition, a separate appendix condenses these statutory provisions into basic categories: basis of liability, extent of liability, plaintiffs and beneficiaries, distribution and miscellaneous features. Because
of the lack of uniformity of the statutory provisions relating to wrongful
death, the appropriate law to be applied with respect to the death action
is often crucial, 9 and, accordingly, the author has also included within
3. 9 & 10 Vict. c. 93.
4. PROSSXR, op. cit. supra note 2,
DgATH § 1:3 (1966).

5. Id.§7:1.
6. Id.§7:2.
7. Id. § 1:18 and §§ 14:1-14:7.

1966).

§

MD.

121; SPXISER, RCOV9RY FOR WRONGFUL

Cone

ANN.

art. 93, § 112 (Cum. Supp.

8. SPISIR, op. cit. supra note 4, § 1:12. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN. art. 101,
§§ 44, 58 (1964). Section 44 gives an option to the dependents, where the employer
deliberately causes the employee's death, to take under the Workmen's Compensation
Act or sue outside of the Act. Section 58 permits the dependents and the insurer to
sue the third party responsible for the employee's death.
9. See, e.g., Griffith v. United Air Lines, Inc., 416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796 (1964),
noted in 25 MD. L. Rv. 238 (1965), involving a wrongful death action commenced
in Pennsylvania, where the decedent was a Pennsylvania resident who boarded a plane
in that state bound for Arizona and was killed in Colorado. If Colorado law was
applied, the plaintiffs would not be entitled to recover loss of accumulated prospective
earnings and would be limited to a rather nominal amount. The court rejected the law
of the place of the wrong rule and applied the "center of gravity" test. Thus, the
plaintiffs were able to take advantage of the more liberal Pennsylvania provisions.

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. XXVII

his treatise a chapter on conflict of laws.' 0 The appendices provide a
ready source for comparison of the features of the various statutes
which might apply to the particular factual situation presented to
the practitioner.
Although legislation has emasculated the rule of Baker v. Bolton,
the author notes that Lord Ellenborough's decision may still thwart
the efforts of counsel representing beneficiaries of the decedent. Since
the cause of action for wrongful death -is created by statute, the basis
of liability is limited by the language of the particular statute involved.
Most states, including Maryland," have incorporated the wording of
Lord Campbell's Act into the wrongful death statute and have predicated liability upon the defendant's commission of a "wrongful act,
neglect or default."' Clearly, this language encompasses common law
torts committed by the defendant. However, as the author indicates,
the statutes are ambiguous as to whether recovery should be allowed
when an action
is couched in terms of breach of contract 13 or breach
4
of warranty.'

Early cases almost uniformly held that an action for wrongful
death would not lie for either breach of contract or breach of warranty
since the applicable statutory language did not specifically refer to such
actions. These holdings confront modern courts with the choice of
developing a common law right of action for wrongful deaths caused
by breach of warranty or contract, and thus overruling Baker v. Bolton,
or of construing the statutes to include such actions.
In the 1961 case of Zostautasv. St. Anthony De PaduaHospital,5
the Supreme Court of Illinois was faced with the problem as to whether
or not a cause of action was stated by the plaintiffs where they alleged
the breach of a contract by the defendant doctor to provide medical
services to the decedent. On the authority of Baker v. Bolton, the
court held that the action could not be maintained. It should be noted
in dictum that the court stated that a breach of contract constituted
a "default" within the meaning of the applicable death statute. Nevertheless, the case demonstrates that Lord Ellenborough has not yet been
put to rest.' 6
The author has purported to develop a comprehensive, impartial
and modern treatise for wrongful death cases. The need for such a
10. SPEISER, op. cit. supra note 4, §§ 13:1-13:12. The author is uniquely qualified
in this area because of his practical experience in cases involving airline tragedies
and his previous writing in that area. See SPEISER, PREPARATION MANUAL FOR
AVIATION NEGLIGENCE CASES (1958).
11. MD. CODE ANN. art. 67, § 1 (Cum. Supp. 1966).
12. 2 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS §§ 24.1-24.7 (1956) ; PROSSER, op. cit. supra note 2,
§ 121; SPEISER, op. cit. supra note 4, §§ 1:8, 2:1 and Appendix A.
13. Id. § 2:10. See also HARPER & JAMES, op. cit. supra note 12, § 24.3; PROSSER,
op. cit. supra note 2, § 121, at 925.
14. Id. § 2:11. See also HARPER & JAMES, op. cit. supra note 12, §§ 24.3, 28.21;
PROSSER, op. cit. supra note 2, § 95, at 652.
15. 23 Ill.
2d 326, 178 N.E.2d 303 (1961).
16. There does not appear to be any express holding by the Maryland Court of
Appeals as to whether breach of contract or breach of warranty actions are encompassed by the Maryland statute. However, in State v. Consolidated Gas, Electric, Light
& Power Co., 146 Md. 390, 126 Atl. 105 (1924), the court's decision assumes that
breach of warranty actions fit within the applicable language.
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work is readily apparent to any practitioner involved in litigation of
this nature. No comprehensive treatise on the subject has been written
since 1912.17 In relatively recent times, significant trends have appeared
which have substantially changed the complexion of wrongful death
actions.
Lord Campbell's Act gave the jury rather broad discretion in
awarding damages since it provided for an award of "such damages as
they may think would be proportioned to the injury." However,
judicial construction of the Act restricted recovery to the "pecuniary
loss" suffered by the beneficiaries.1 8 A majority of the states have
adopted the pecuniary loss requirement either by express provision or
by judicial construction. 9 One of the most significant trends in this
type of litigation has been with respect to the "pecuniary loss" requirement. Whereas most of the older cases limited the beneficiaries' recovery to provable loss of contributions from the decedent, modern
cases allow losses based on other elements.
In Davidson Transfer & Storage Co. v. State,2" the Court of
Appeals reviewed prior Maryland authorities and stated:
We think that properly interpreted, those authorities cannot
be regarded as holding that in order to justify recovery there must
be a direct showing that the origin of the loss is confined solely
to pecuniary considerations, because it would scarcely be argued
that upon the death of a parent a surviving infant child has not
suffered a loss which in many instances includes intangibles for
which there can be no compensation, and for which the law makes
no attempt to compensate, but must define the loss for which
compensation is given. This may appear in the loss of the benefits
or advantages which the plaintiff might have expected to receive
from the parent had not the life of the latter been suddenly ended.
Such losses are therefore, because no other remedy for compensation exists, translated into pecuniary damages.
In addition to decisions such as Davidson, many courts have
accepted evidence to establish "pecuniary loss" which previously would
not have been considered. These decisions are a credit to the ingenuity
of the bar in presenting the beneficiaries' claim within the framework
of the restrictive concept of "pecuniary loss." Bearing in mind that the
rule of Baker v. Bolton involved a husband's action for the death of
his wife, decisions such as Legare v. United States,21 illustrate the
change in attitude by many courts. In Legare, the court awarded
$98,838 damages to a husband as the "pecuniary loss" occasioned by
the death of his wife on the basis of the "substitute housewife" concept.
17. TIFFANY, DEATH BY WRONGFUL ACT (2d ed. 1913). The writer would not
consider SCHREIBER,

DAMAGES

IN PERSONAL

INJURY AND WRONGFUL

DEATH

CASES

(1965), published by the Practicing Law Institute as a "comprehensive treatise" and
does not believe that it purports to be one.
18. SPEISER, op. cit. supra note 4, § 3:1.

19. See, e.g., Baltimore and Reisterstown Turnpike Road v. State, 71 Md. 573,
18 Atl. 884 (1889).
20. 180 Md. 63, 73, 22 A.2d 582, 587 (1941).
21. 195 F. Supp. 557 (S.D. Fla. 1961).
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For the most part, Mr. Speiser has succeeded in his attempt and
has provided the bar with a welcomed addition to any legal library.
He has more than adequately discussed the aspects of liability, proper
beneficiaries, damages, procedure, evidence, defenses and conflict of
laws. 22 Moreover, the author has included in his treatise various charts

and tables, jury instructions and separate appendices containing life
expectancy tables and a check list of damage information, which is
cross-referenced to the appropriate sections in the treatise. The bar as
a whole will undoubtedly find these features of the treatise to be most
helpful in preparing for the trial of wrongful death actions.
Although Mr. Speiser has achieved his primary purpose, one
feature of the work detracts from the value of the remainder of his
treatise. The author has selected a chapter entitled "Specific Situations" for inclusion in his volume. 23 In this chapter, Mr. Speiser sets
forth hypothetical situations involving the death of a specific person
with a specific beneficiary seeking to recover for that death. This particular portion of the volume laboriously demonstrates the manner in
which the attorney representing .the beneficiary should present his
evidence in order to obtain what is commonly referred to as "full dollar
value" for the client. For example, the author sets forth charts showing the value of a housewife to the surviving spouse. He then proceeds
to set forth -in question and answer form the proposed testimony of the
surviving spouse and testimony from an employment specialist, professional home economist and family service agency expert to establish
the "full dollar value" of the loss. In other sections of this chapter, Mr.
Speiser, in addition to setting out expert testimony, has included detailed
proposed exhibits to 'be referred to by the expert in his examination.
This particular chapter will undoubtedly be useful to the claimants' attorney; however, -it subjects the balance of his efforts to charges
of lack of objectivity. Primarily because of this chapter, the publisher
has advertised the volume, not as a comprehensive treatise, but as a
book to show the plaintiffs' attorney how to obtain "full dollar value"
in wrongful death cases. This promotion does not do justice to the text
as a whole. In the opinion of the writer, Mr. Speiser should have
deleted this material from his treatise and published the same as a
separate practice manual.
Donald E. Sharpe*
22. The actual organization selected by the author is: Introduction, Basis of
Liability, Damages, Specific Situations, Defenses, Mitigation of Damages, Limitations
on Death Damages, Computation and Adjustment, Excessive and Inadequate Damages,

Classes of Beneficiaries, Practice and Procedure, Evidence, Conflict of Laws and
Survival Statutes. The placement selected is not entirely satisfactory since the chapters
relating to damages are interrupted by the chapter on defenses. It would also seem
desirable to have the procedure section in closer proximity to the defense chapter since
the author includes the defense of limitations within the procedure chapter. However,

Mr. Speiser has provided the user with an adequate index which will overcome this
minor difficulty and facilitate the beneficial use of the text.
23. SvmstR, op. cit. supra note 4, at 263-407.
* Associate, Piper & Marbury, Baltimore, Maryland; A.B. 1960, University of
Maryland; LL.B. 1963, University of Maryland.

